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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to be secure in one’s own person is a natural, fundamental
right.1 Many natural rights have been legally recognized, and legal
mechanisms safeguard these rights by providing legal remedies to ensure
that rights exist in a practical sense rather than as theoretical concepts.2
Consider, for example, the right to procreate.3 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the Court strongly characterized sterilization as a permanent deprivation of
an important human right.4 Almost sixty years later, in Robinson v.
Cutchin, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
considered a case in which the plaintiff alleged that she was sterilized
during a Cesarean section surgery without her consent.5 In a cavalier
manner at odds with the grave tone of the Skinner court, the Robinson court
dismissed the plaintiff’s case.6 The Robinson court held that because Mrs.
Robinson suffered no more pain or injury than was normal following a
Cesarean section, her unconsented sterilization was not harmful and her
subsequent infertility was no injury.7 Furthermore, the court considered the
dignity aspect of a battery action and found Mrs. Robinson’s injury
lacking; in effect, the court substituted its “judgment” for Mrs. Robinson’s
right to procreate.8 Because Maryland only recognizes informed consent
violations as negligence causes of action, not battery, and Mrs. Robinson
1. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (holding
that the right to bodily integrity is a universal human right).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (creating a legal
remedy is the legal mechanism to defend against and remedy an invasion of a right).
3. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (identifying procreation
as a basic civil right of man because the ability to have children can have profound
personal effects and determines the racial and social composition of future
generations).
4. See id. at 541 (discussing the irreparable personal injury of sterilization and the
insidious effects to society of the practice, particularly when used to conduct eugenics).
5. See Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490-91 (D. Md. 2001) (noting
that although her consent to the Cesarean is undisputed, Mrs. Robinson did not consent
to the tubal ligation procedure).
6. See id. at 493 (holding that Maryland does not recognize battery in informed
consent cases and that Mrs. Robinson could not state a claim for negligence without
suffering an injury).
7. See id. (noting that Mrs. Robinson did not even know she was infertile until
twenty-one months after the surgery and that her only physical injury stemmed from
the Cesarean to which she had consented).
8. See id. (explaining that since Mrs. Robinson had already born six children, she
could not reasonably find sterilization offensive).
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could not sustain negligence without a legally recognized injury, she was
left without a cause of action or a legal remedy.9 Without a remedy to
assert against Dr. Cutchin’s unconsented sterilization, Mrs. Robinson’s
right to procreate was quantified at six children.10
This Comment argues that the inadequacies of the informed consent
doctrine fail to ensure the fundamental right to bodily integrity by
analyzing pain management treatment during childbirth. Part II will
examine the modern doctrine of informed consent and how it evolved,
inquire into other areas of law to identify analogous injuries to inadequate
informed consent, and discuss why maternity care is an excellent lens
through which to analyze informed consent.11 To demonstrate the
limitations of informed consent law in America, this Comment analyzes the
law through a hypothetical built on common maternity care practices and
average patient experiences.12 Part III analyzes the hypothetical scenario
under the informed consent statutes of the states of New York, Washington,
and Wisconsin.13 Part IV discusses the policy implications of maintaining
the status quo—which largely provides no legal remedy for the failure to
obtain informed consent—and will recommend that states consider
adopting informational standing to ensure the right to bodily integrity is not
impinged.14 Part V concludes that as the modern doctrine of informed
consent evolved, it has become disconnected from its original purpose and
turned the fundamental right of bodily integrity into an illusory right.15

9. See id. at 495 (dismissing Mrs. Robinson’s case because she lacked any legally
recognized injury).
10. See id. at 491 n.1 (detailing Mrs. Robinson’s procreational history by
specifically noting that she had three children with her husband and three prior children
born out of wedlock).
11. See infra Part II (establishing the foundation for the analysis of informed
consent for the management of labor pain).
12. See infra Part II (detailing each hypothetical assumption and the data that
supports each assumption. A hypothetical situation is used because, as this Comment
will show, the injury requirement leaves many potential plaintiffs without a cause of
action and has thus limited case law).
13. See infra Part III (analyzing these particular informed consent statutes because
New York State uses the physician-centered standard, Washington State uses the
patient-centered standard, and Wisconsin uses a hybrid approach that blends both
standards).
14. See infra Part IV (recommending that informed consent statutes be amended to
explicitly state that inadequate informed consent is a legally cognizable injury, and
courts should apply the doctrine of informational standing to recognize the denial of
information as a legally cognizable injury).
15. See infra Part V (concluding that informed consent no longer protects bodily
integrity).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Informed Consent
Beginning with a string of cases in the early 1900s, courts began to
recognize physician liability for medical battery when physicians acted
without or exceeded the scope of a patient’s expressed or implied consent.16
In 1957, California was the first state to articulate the modern informed
consent doctrine as one of medical negligence rather than intentional tort.17
Subsequently, most states codified or affirmed through case law the
physician’s duty to require informed consent.18 The physician’s duty, as it
evolved, was defined under one of two standards: (1) the reasonable care
provider, or (2) the reasonable patient.19 While the standard will determine
how much information is disclosed to the patient, there is general
agreement that adequate informed consent disclosures include the purpose
of the proposed treatment, its risks and benefits, available alternatives
(including risks and benefits of alternative treatments), and the effect of no
treatment.20 Once a patient is properly informed, it is the patient’s right to
choose among the various alternatives rather than a physician’s right to
prescribe the “best” treatment, even when that choice may be the more
dangerous treatment.21
When consent is inadequate rather than nonexistent, such as when a
16. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Extending
Operation or Treatment Beyond That Expressly Authorized, 56 A.L.R.2D 695, 704-05
(1957) (detailing 19th century cases where physicians faced tort liability for battery or
trespass after successful operations because the operations were unlawful infringement
of patient’s right when there was no consent).
17. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) (classifying a physician’s decision to withhold material information as a
breach of his duty rather than considering patient’s rights).
18. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that some
states kept an action for battery in the common law because a treatment lacking any
consent is a battery).
19. Compare Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E. 98, 103 (Ind. 1992) (explaining that
the reasonably prudent physician standard measures disclosure by physician’s
judgment because a physician is trained to be prudent but cannot be trained to
anticipate what every patient would want to know), with Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10-12
(articulating that the prudent patient standard measures disclosures by a patient’s
judgment as a necessity for patient autonomy because otherwise all discretion is ceded
to the physician).
20. E.g., Anna Karpman, Note & Comment, Informed Consent: Does the First
Amendment Protect a Patient’s Right to Choose Alternative Treatment?, 16 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 933, 934 (2000) (describing the consensus of the general categories
while noting the level of disclosure remains disputed).
21. See Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
that the competent patient’s right to select among medically acceptable treatments is
absolute). See generally Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing that the right to control the course of one’s own treatment arises from the
individual right to bodily integrity).
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patient agrees to a specific procedure, but the physician does not tell the
patient a procedure’s risks, or all the risks, the failure to obtain informed
consent is generally categorized as negligence.22 Thus, for a cause of
action, a plaintiff requires an injury proximately caused by the procedure
that is causally connected with the inadequate consent.23 Under the
negligence standard, a patient who received inadequate informed consent
will be left with no legal remedy if the medical procedure did not result in a
legally recognized injury because the negligence standard derives from the
physician’s breach of a duty to the patient.24 This is contrary to its battery
origins, which derive from the patient’s right to be secure in her person.25
B. Beyond Informed Consent: Informational Standing Recognizes That
Denial of Information Can Be an Injury in Its Own Right
Early English and American law required no injury beyond the violation
of a private right to sustain a cause of action.26 Legal scholars and justices
throughout the 1700s and 1800s recognized that a right required an avenue
for vindication or it was no right at all.27 Courts repeatedly found that
when a plaintiff’s private rights were violated, despite any actual injury,
nominal damages redressed the plaintiff sufficiently.28 This doctrine of
standing was reevaluated in the 20th Century with the expansion of
government regulations and public rights where courts began requiring an
“injury-in-fact” and seemed to abandon the explicit “inquiry into the

22. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (discussing Dean Prosser’s conclusion that the
modern trend is to classify inadequate consent as negligence because that is in
alignment with the general classification of medical malpractice as a type of
negligence).
23. See id. at 11 (explaining the connection between informed consent and the
cause of action).
24. See Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that
women who received abortions yet alleged inadequate informed consent did not have a
legally recognized injury when abortions were performed competently). Contra Cruz
Aviles v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202 (D.P.R. 2000) (explaining
that inadequate informed consent is not consent, therefore it is independent and does
not require any additional medical malpractice in diagnosis or treatment).
25. See Schoendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”).
26. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 279-80 (2008) (detailing the history of standing with regards to
private rights).
27. See id. at 285-86 (exploring opinions of private rights within that time period to
show that in a practical sense a right is defined as the existence of a legal remedy to
defend it).
28. See id. at 279, 326 (discussing the history of nominal damages and noting the
effectiveness of nominal damages in deterring police misconduct).
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invasion of legal rights.”29
Recently, the “injury-in-fact” requirement has begun to change with the
recognition of a new class of injury through informational standing.30 In
FEC v. Akins, a group of voters sought to challenge the Federal Election
Commission’s (FEC) determination that the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) was not a “political committee.”31 The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging that the FEC decision denied them relevant
information to which they were legally entitled under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) because the FEC’s determination allowed
AIPAC to avoid making informational disclosures.32 Contrary to the
Solicitor General’s argument that the plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury-infact,” the Court held that the informational injury suffered here was
adequately concrete and specific, and the information directly related to the
exercise of a fundamental political right: voting. Thus, Akins signals that
when Congress creates a right to information, and a person is denied that
information, that person may have standing without any further injury.33
C. Maternity Care Is Uniquely Suited for a Test Case Analysis of the
Adequacy of Informed Consent Statutes
1. Maternity Care: Unique, yet Universal
Pregnancy serves as a window through which to examine medical care
and is an excellent platform for the analysis of a legal concept—informed
consent—that applies to all forms of medical care. Unlike many medical
conditions, pregnancy is a predictable condition: for most women,
pregnancy will culminate in labor and then birth after a gestation period of
38-42 weeks.34 With no medical intervention, pregnancy culminates in a
29. See Jonathan E. Wells, Comment, Shouldn’t Standing Be Closer to the Heart of
Congressional Intent?, 49 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1365-66 (2000) (explaining the recent
history of standing and criticizing how this judicial invention abandoned previous
private right precedent).
30. See Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the
Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 689 (2007) (discussing the
informational standing doctrine developed in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), as a
novel method for expanding standing to any statutorily-identified group entitled to the
information specified in the statute).
31. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 16-18 (explaining that by ruling AIPAC was not a
political committee, the FEC shielded AIPAC from disclosure requirements because
only political committees must meet the FECA disclosure requirements at issue).
32. See id. at 20 (noting that plaintiffs were simply citizens, not members of
AIPAC; however, Congress explicitly gave all citizens standing in the language of
FECA).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 663-65 (1999) (exploring the application of
prudential requirements to informational standing).
34. See generally JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT
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birth that both mother and baby survive 99 out of 100 times.35 Although
medical intervention is sometimes necessary, the predictability of the
outcome without intervention allows medical intervention to be evaluated
more readily with pregnancy than with other medical conditions.36 Again,
in contrast to medical conditions that develop rapidly and do not grant
sufficient time to analyze patient-physician interactions, maternity care
serves as an optimal lens through which to examine patient-provider
interactions because pregnancy develops over several months and the
general standard of care involves many provider visits.37 Finally, while
most people will not experience most medical conditions, the universality
of birth is compelling: everyone begins life through birth, and the United
States spends $86 billion each year on hospitalization related to pregnancy
and childbirth.38
2. Test Case Hypothetical
Anecdotal and statistical evidence indicates that America’s maternity
care system often fails to meet legal standards of informed consent and that
the majority of women are left without legal remedy.39 Consequentially,
this area has not been fully developed through case law, and this Comment
will use Ashley Typical, a hypothetical patient, who is in good health at the
time of conception and is low-risk and healthy through her pregnancy, as
the test case patient based predominantly on the most common maternity
care experiences.

CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN MATERNITY CARE 11 (2007) (explaining that the due date, a
median within a normal range, is calculated by adding 280 days to the first day of the
woman’s last menstrual period).
35. See Irvine Loudin, Maternal Mortality in the Past and Its Relevance to
Developing Countries Today, 72 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 241S, 242S (2000) (detailing the
historical rates of maternal mortality from the 1850s to 2000).
36. See id. at 244S, 245S (explaining how causes of maternal mortality have varied
with societal changes).
37. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PRENATAL CARE:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1-2 (2009) [hereinafter HHS FAQ], available at
http://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-sheet/prenatalcare.pdf (defining prenatal care and detailing the recommended appointment schedule).
38. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS
IN THE USA 1 (2010) [hereinafter DEADLY DELIVERY], available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf (discussing the
economic and social costs of birth).
39. See EUGENE R. DECLERCQ, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTIONS, LISTENING TO MOTHERS
II: REPORT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL U.S. SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING
EXPERIENCES 72-73 (2006) [hereinafter LISTENING SURVEY], available at
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/listeningtomothers/ (analyzing a national survey
of American women, who revealed anecdotal indignities, overall lack of choices, and
significant knowledge gaps regarding the risks of the treatments that they had
received).
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Ms. Typical wanted to be pregnant.40 She first met her physician, Dr.
OB, during her first prenatal appointment when she was nine weeks
pregnant.41 She met with Dr. OB during thirteen prenatal appointments.42
During one of her appointments, Ms. Typical expressed concern and fear
about labor pain, and Dr. OB assured her that anesthesiologists at Hospital
General are available 24/7, and she could have an epidural whenever she
needed one.43 For clarity and simplicity, it is assumed that Ms. Typical
asked no more questions regarding labor pain, and Dr. OB volunteered no
additional information.
During her fortieth week of pregnancy, labor began for Ms. Typical.44
She proceeded to Hospital General, where she had planned to give birth.45
Ms. Typical experienced pain in labor that intensified as her labor
progressed.46 Upon her arrival at Hospital General, Ms. Typical’s freedom
of movement was restricted; she was attached to an Electronic Fetal
Monitor and an IV.47 She did not use the shower for pain relief.48 Ms.
Typical labored in her labor and delivery room with her husband, but she
did not have a doula.49 A registered nurse (RN) monitored and periodically
checked on Ms. Typical, but the RN at no time offered comfort measures to
help Ms. Typical labor.50
40. See id. at 18 (reporting that the majority of participants (57%) wanted to be
pregnant).
41. See id. at 20 (reporting that most women had their first prenatal appointment
during the ninth week of pregnancy).
42. See id. at 21 (reporting that 73% of women saw the same provider each time
and 79% of women had an obstetrician-gynecologist as their primary caregiver); see
also HHS FAQ, supra note 37, at 3-4 (detailing the recommended standard of care,
which involves many prenatal appointments).
43. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 164 (describing the climbing epidural rate that
exceeds 99% at some hospitals and the decreasing availability of pain management
options in labor).
44. See id. at 11 (detailing the median gestation is forty weeks).
45. See id. at xx (noting that in the United States, 99% of women give birth in a
hospital).
46. See INA MAY GASKIN, BIRTH MATTERS 38-39 (2011) (refuting the assumptions
that labor pain is pointless and inevitable and explaining that pain is not analogous to
suffering and vice versa).
47. See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 34, at xix (describing the typical labor experience
as involving up to 16 different tubes, drugs, or attachments restraining the laboring
patient).
48. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that while only 4% of
women used the shower for pain relief, of those that did, the majority found it at least
“somewhat helpful” and 33% found it “very helpful”).
49. See id. at 30 (reporting that 82% of women labored with a husband or partner
for support, but only 3% used a doula, the popular name for a labor companion,
typically a woman, who is trained to provide non-medical support to the laboring
woman).
50. Cf. BLOCK, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing how professional pressures on
nurses increase when technology is valued more than people).
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When Dr. OB checked on her, Ms. Typical described her pain and asked
for help managing it.51 Dr. OB said he could call the anesthesiologist to
arrange an epidural.52 Ms. Typical met with the anesthesiologist who
explained how the procedure would go and gave her an informed consent
form filled with standard language regarding risks.53 She signed it and was
given the epidural.54
3. Test Case Statutes
Ms. Typical’s situation will be analyzed under three state statutes: New
York, Washington, and Wisconsin. New York codified informed consent
under “the reasonable medical practitioner” standard.55 Washington uses
the “reasonably prudent patient” (RPP) standard.56 Wisconsin is a hybrid
of the two standards because facially the statute is a “reasonably wellqualified physician” standard, but as applied, Wisconsin courts consider it a
“reasonably prudent patient” standard.57
i. New York State
For a cause of action under New York State’s informed consent statute, a
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the foreseeable risks and benefits of the
proposed treatment and any alternatives that a “reasonable medical . . .
practitioner under similar circumstance would have disclosed” were not
disclosed; (2) a “reasonably prudent patient” would have declined the
treatment if proper disclosure occurred; and (3) the lack of informed
consent proximately caused a legally recognized injury.58 Even if a
plaintiff is able to show the first prong, the objective test of the second
prong is difficult to satisfy because the fact finder will weigh the risk of
having the procedure versus the risk of forgoing it, without considering
51. See id. at 174-75 (discussing a laboring woman’s need to manage or work
through labor pain).
52. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that the majority of
surveyed mothers used epidural or spinal analgesia).
53. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 24 (describing various side effects of the epidural
procedure).
54. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that 76% of surveyed
mothers used epidural or spinal analgesia).
55. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a three
prong test to sustain a cause of action).
56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (articulating a four prong test a RPP
must prove).
57. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating an incredibly broad duty of
disclosure); see also Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis.
1999) (articulating the test for disclosure as what the RPP would require to make an
intelligent decision).
58. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (describing the
limitations on medical malpractice action for informed consent).
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remote risks.59 In Avakian v. United States, the district court held that the
“reasonably prudent patient” would find that when the risks of a
myelogram (a diagnostic procedure), not including the remote risk of
paralysis, were weighed against the patient’s chronic back pain, which
could not be properly diagnosed and treated without the myelogram, the
RPP would consent to a myelogram because the risks of forgoing treatment
outweigh the procedure’s risks.60 Mrs. Avakian’s actual preference or risk
tolerance was irrelevant because the standard used is an objective one.61
In addition to establishing the first two prongs, there must be an injury
beyond violating one’s right to bodily integrity for an informed consent
claim to proceed.62 While New York courts have found a sufficient injury
where a patient’s child is injured during birth, as occurred in Cerny v.
Williams, the courts have not recognized a blood transfusion to be a
sufficient injury even when it is against the person’s faith, as was the case
in DiGeronimo v. Fuchs.63
ii. Washington State
Washington’s informed consent statute requires four elements to support
an informed consent claim: (1) that the health care provider failed to
disclose a “material fact;” (2) that the patient was either unaware or not
fully informed of such “material fact;” (3) that without such “material
fact,” a “reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not
have consent[ed] to the procedure;” and (4) that the treatment proximately
caused the patient to suffer an injury.64
In addition to this statute, Washington retains the common law action for

59. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that the RPP would not consider remote risks, even serious ones such as paralysis).
60. See id. at 731-32 (holding that the RPP would weigh the risks of forgoing the
myelogram against the ordinary risks of the procedure, which included nausea,
seizures, and temporary disorientation).
61. See id. at 731 (omitting any discussion of plaintiff’s personal risk tolerance or
valuation of treatment).
62. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that
a blood transfusion to a devout Jehovah’s Witness does not constitute a legally
recognized injury because transfusion was lifesaving and New York does not have a
wrongful life statute). But see Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552-53 (App.
Div. 2006) (holding that birth defects that occurred because a Cesarean section was
delayed for unsuccessful induction would satisfy proximate injury if the plaintiff can
establish that the Cesarean was not disclosed as an alternative).
63. See Cerny, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 552 (finding that the injuries to a patient’s child
due to the mother’s medical treatment during labor would satisfy proximate injury).
But see DiGeronimo, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 907 (holding that without physical harm or
sufficient emotional distress, there is no injury).
64. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (describing the elements of proof
required for an informed consent failure).
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medical battery where no consent is obtained.65 Courts have held that
medical battery protects an individual’s right to privacy and bodily
integrity, whereas informed consent protects a patient’s autonomy through
adequate information.66 As demonstrated in Degel v. Buty, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that divorcing bodily integrity from informed
consent and applying an objective standard violates a patient’s due process
rights.67 Under Washington law, if a patient consents to a procedure, but
would not have consented to the procedure had she known of an alternative
that should have been disclosed, she will be without a legal remedy
because: (1) if she fails the third prong (the RPP would have consented),
she has no informed consent case; and (2) by her consent, though
uninformed, she has foreclosed a battery action.68 The statute’s third prong
is a factually driven inquiry, and as the court stated in Bundrick v. Stewart,
even undisputed subjective consent prior to a procedure will not be
dispositive for the objective test.69 The fourth prong is satisfied when a
patient is injured by a risk he was unaware of or if he would have been
uninjured had he chosen an undisclosed alternative; this can be determined
by the fact-finder or through the parties’ stipulation.70
iii. Wisconsin State
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute is uncommonly broad and requires
that physicians describe the risks, benefits, and all alternative treatments.71
Wisconsin courts have held that disclosure requirements are necessary
because patients need information in order to exercise intelligent treatment
decisions.72 Furthermore, a competent patient has the absolute right to
65. See Bundrick v. Stewart, 114 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(discussing legislative history and statutory language to determine that enactment of an
informed consent statute did not supersede a cause of action for medical battery).
66. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing between the purposes of battery and informed
consent to establish why battery requires no injury).
67. See Degel v. Buty, 29 P.3d 768, 769-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (separating
patient autonomy from bodily integrity because they are different rights that require
different protections).
68. See id. (holding that because the standard for recovery and patient choice do
not have a causal relationship, an objective standard for an informed consent action that
ignores what a patient subjectively would have chosen may deny recovery, but does not
deny her the right to determine her own care).
69. See id. (holding that the objective standard was not met and a reasonably
prudent patient would have consented to the procedure despite conflicting expert
testimony).
70. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1208 (further articulating the negligence standard as
it differentiates from medical battery because no injury is required under battery).
71. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating the expansive disclosure
requirement for treatment alternatives).
72. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 588 N.W.2d 26, 30
(Wis. 1999) (detailing how informed consent is patient-driven because it is a central
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choose among viable medical alternatives, even if the alternative is not per
se recommended.73
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute provides that a physician may
defend his failure to disclose by asserting defenses such as: the information
was beyond what a “reasonably well-qualified physician in a similar
medical classification would know,” the information was so technical that
it was beyond the patient’s comprehension, the information was already
apparent or known to the patient, or there was an “extremely remote
possibilit[y] that might [have] falsely or detrimentally alarm[ed] the
patient.”74 The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Dibbel that
though the list of defenses within the statute is not exhaustive, courts
should be cautious when instructing juries on defenses not expressly
provided in the informed consent statute.75 If the physician fails to disclose
information and cannot assert a defense, courts apply a RPP test to
determine whether the patient would have consented to the procedure if the
information had been disclosed, thus creating a cause of action.76 Because
Wisconsin courts view informed consent as a process, rather than an event,
which may evolve with new medical or legal developments, patients can
revoke consent.77 Thus, if the factual record shows the patient revoked
consent, Wisconsin courts do not apply the objective test.78 Such was the
case in Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., where the court held that the
patient’s unequivocal revocation of consent should have triggered a new
informed consent discussion.79
Furthermore, Wisconsin courts have stressed that a patient does not have
an affirmative duty to determine the completeness, accuracy, or
truthfulness of the physician’s disclosures because of the special

method to ensure the fundamental right of bodily integrity).
73. See id. at 26, 29-32 (holding that a patient had an absolute right to choose a
Cesarean section over an induction because both were viable medical options).
74. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (listing defenses to failing to disclose treatment
information; other defenses that are not applicable for this hypothetical include
emergency situations and incapable patients).
75. See Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 372 (Wis. 1999) (explaining that
deviating from the specified defenses should only be considered when evidence of a
specific reason for withholding information has been offered by the defendant).
76. See id. at 366 (explaining that Wisconsin follows the majority of jurisdictions
by applying the objective test to prevent plaintiff’s hindsight from unfairly affecting
litigation).
77. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 32-33 (declining to define informed consent as a
singular event because, as circumstances change, the risks may change and/or the
patient’s tolerance of risk may change).
78. See id. at 34 (stating that applying the objective test after clear revocation could
lead to “absurd results”).
79. See id. at 34-35 (holding that once the patient requested a Cesarean section, the
physician was required to revisit the risks and benefits of all viable medical options).
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relationship of trust that patients have with their doctors.80 Nonetheless,
Wisconsin’s patient-centered informed consent statute is still a negligence
statute, requiring an injury to sustain a cause of action.81 Unlike New
York, under Wisconsin’s informed consent statute, the injury may be a
possible complication that arises out of a properly performed procedure;
such as in Brown, when the plaintiff suffered discomfort and disfigurement
arising from a properly performed double mastectomy.82
III. ANALYSIS
The disclosure of alternative procedures is an important aspect of
informed consent because not having this type of information effectively
restricts a patient’s ability to make intelligent choices about her own care.83
Ms. Typical sought pain management, and she was offered only one
treatment, an epidural, and was deemed to have “chosen” it.84 Even
assuming Ms. Typical received adequate information regarding the risks of
receiving an epidural through the standard informed consent form, Dr. OB
never disclosed to Ms. Typical any alternative treatments for her labor pain
at any point in her treatment.85
A. In New York, Ms. Typical Does Not Have a Cause of Action Because
Failure to Discuss Pain Management Alternatives Falls Within New York’s
Limitations on Medical Malpractice Action Based on Lack of Informed
Consent and Bars a Cause of Action.
Even though Ms. Typical chose the only treatment option Dr. OB
presented to her at any time during his eight-month treatment of her
pregnancy, she will not be able to satisfy any of three prongs of New
York’s informed consent statute necessary to establish a cause of action.86

80. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 362 (declining to hold that the patient was guilty of
contributory negligence for failing to ask additional questions because it is not the
patient’s job to cure the physician’s failure to disclose).
81. See id. at 366 (explaining that the informed consent statute codifies the
physicians’ duty, and when plaintiffs’ damages resulted from physicians’ breach of the
duty to provide informed consent, they are liable for those damages).
82. See id. at 364-65 (holding that once the fact-finder finds that a reasonable
patient would have refused the procedure, any harm that results from the procedure will
be sufficient to sustain a negligence action under informed consent).
83. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (holding reasonable
disclosure of alternatives is a vital aspect of the physician’s duty).
84. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the test patient’s situation).
85. See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that initially Ms. Typical described her concerns
about labor pain and later asked for assistance managing pain, and in both instances Dr.
OB offered an epidural as her “cure” without any discussion of alternatives).
86. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a threeprong test for a reasonably prudent medical practitioner).
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1. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the First Prong of the Informed
Consent Statute Because a Reasonable Medical Practitioner Under Similar
Circumstances Probably Would Not Have Disclosed Any Other Pain
Management Alternatives.
Under the first prong, Ms. Typical will have to establish that Dr. OB
deviated from an accepted community standard of medical practice when
he failed to disclose other pain management alternatives.87 Deviation from
accepted medical practice is a factually driven inquiry that relies heavily on
expert testimony but can still be decided as a matter of law or stipulated to
by the parties.88
Because normative practices often define standards of practice, it is
important to remember that epidural rates are extraordinarily high
compared to any other form of pain management technique.89 Given that
some forms of pain management are considered as effective as epidurals at
managing pain, yet lack some of the serious side effects, it may be inferred
that many women are not fully aware of the availability and effectiveness
of other pain management alternatives when they choose epidurals for pain
management.90 Conflicting testimony of medical experts that a doctor
deviated from accepted medical practice by not describing pain
management alternatives is not sufficient to create a question of fact as to
whether the patient acted under informed consent.91 Even if Ms. Typical
has an expert testify that he or she would have disclosed alternate pain
management options, a court, as occurred in Cerny, may be unconvinced
by the expert’s testimony when it considers the sheer magnitude of epidural
usage in labor as compared to other methods.92 Therefore, the court is
likely to rule as a matter of law that Dr. OB did not deviate from the

87. See, e.g., DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (Sup. Ct. 2011)
(detailing that under a medical negligence standard the physician’s duty is defined by
complying with community standards).
88. See Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 555 (App. Div. 2006) (allowing
parties to stipulate that failing to undertake the curative step of a Cesarean section was
not in accordance with the doctor’s standard of care).
89. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that epidural use far
exceeds other pain management techniques).
90. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 38-40, 53-54 (exploring women’s attitudes about
pain in labor and detailing their lack of knowledge of other effective pain relief
methods such as doulas, comfort measures, or water (bath or shower)).
91. See id. at 38-39 (noting that in Cerny, even though the plaintiffs’ medical
expert testified that a forty-three minute delay to begin a Cesarean section following a
failed induction was a departure from accepted medical practice, the court found the
expert’s testimony unconvincing and held as a matter of law that there was no
departure from standard medical practice).
92. See Cerny, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (holding that as a matter of law, a forty-three
minute delay from the time that the Pitocin was discontinued until the delivery was not
inconsistent with acceptable standards of care despite conflicting expert testimony).
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standard of practice.93 Again, because disclosure is measured normatively,
it is likely that Dr. OB could establish as a matter of fact, even if not as a
matter of law, that he did not deviate from the standard of practice by only
describing, then offering, the epidural as Ms. Typical’s only treatment
option for her pain.94
2. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the Second Prong of the Informed
Consent Statute Because a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Probably
Consent to an Epidural for Pain Management.
New York’s RPP calculates treatment decisions by considering the risks
of the treatment compared to the risks of refusing the treatment without
considering remote risks.95 In Avakian, the court found that the RPP would
have consented to a myelogram because the risk of forgoing the myelogram
outweighed the risks of the procedure.96 The court also held that the RPP
would not consider the remote possibility of paralysis, even though there
were at least two reported cases of irreversible neurological
complications.97 Further, consenting to a myelogram did not guarantee that
Mrs. Avakian would be cured of her pain, and the facts that Mrs. Avakian
had periodically suffered back pain throughout her life, was an active
mother of a small child, and contributed to family finances by working
outside the home did not enter into the RPP calculus.98
Just as the myelogram may have diagnosed Mrs. Avakian’s condition but
did not guarantee relief, an epidural may grant a majority of women relief
but will be ineffective for a minority of laboring mothers.99 While labor
pain is temporary rather than chronic, and the procedure is different, the
risk factors of epidurals are similar to myelograms: laboring women may
experience nausea; headaches; itching; incomplete pain relief; a dangerous
93. See id. (holding that an expert’s testimony does not necessarily create an issue
of fact).
94. See id. at 550-52 (indicating that whether the defendant committed medical
negligence and failed to obtain informed consent before inducing plaintiff was an issue
of fact).
95. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(dismissing even serious risks such as death because the RPP does not consider such
remote risks).
96. See id. at 731-32 (holding that the risks of the myelogram were low and worth
taking because the myelogram could have proven that Avakian had a herniated disc,
which, if properly treated, may have alleviated her intermittent back pain).
97. See id. at 731 (noting that at the time the procedure was performed only two
known cases of paralysis resulted from the approximately 2.5 million myelograms that
had been performed).
98. See id. at 726-28 (concluding that Mrs. Avakian’s decision to seek treatment
was dispositive of her risk valuation).
99. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that 9% of surveyed
women found that epidurals were not at all helpful or not very helpful in managing
labor pain, and an additional 10% of women surveyed found it only somewhat helpful).
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drop in blood pressure experienced by 20-30% of women; a fever which
will develop in 15-20% of women; blocking of natural endorphins;
increased risk of pelvic, pelvic floor, and vaginal injury; and increased risk
of Cesarean section.100 Though epidural patients face increased risk of
paralysis compared to myelogram patients, the risk of paralysis or death,
though possible, is remote; therefore, in New York, the RPP would
disregard those risks.101 Overall, a New York court is likely to find that a
myelogram is similar enough to an epidural for the court to find that the
RPP would probably consent to an epidural.102 Furthermore, an epidural’s
popularity is likely to be a dispositive factor.103 Hence, it seems likely that
regardless of whether Ms. Typical would have consented to an epidural if
she had other options, in New York, the RPP would have consented.
3. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the Third Prong of the Informed
Consent Statute Because Even if Ms. Typical Is Injured as a Result of
Receiving the Epidural, the Lack of Informed Consent Would Not Be the
Proximate Cause of Her Injuries.
Finally, unless Ms. Typical has a separate cause of action for a
negligently administered epidural, she will not have an injury sufficient to
support the damage necessary for a lack of informed consent cause of
action.104 As the court held in Avakian, the mere occurrence of a possible
risk does not satisfy the proximate injury element if the physician performs
the procedure properly.105 Conversely, the court in Cerny v. Williams
found that if the mother was not informed about the risks of induction and
the induction was not performed in accordance with the standard of care,
then any injuries caused to the child by delaying a Cesarean section would
100. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 172, 174 (describing the procedure of inserting a
needle into the epidural space surrounding the spinal cord, then replacing the needle
with a catheter through which an anesthetic and opiate cocktail “bathes” the spinal
nerves and numbs all or most feeling below the navel).
101. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at 77 (describing the risk of infection
that results from inserting a needle into the spinal space and that can result in
meningitis and death).
102. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 171 (detailing that though epidurals have many
side effects and are associated with longer labors, increased likelihood of vaginal tears
or episiotomies, and increased rates of Cesarean sections, the remote risks of death or
paralysis are very rare, much like the myelogram procedure).
103. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (stating that more than 75% of
women surveyed used an epidural for pain management).
104. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(explaining that injuries which occur as part of a properly performed medical procedure
are not sufficient to constitute proximate cause for policy reasons).
105. See id. at 732-33 (holding that because her doctor complied with the necessary
standard of care, Mrs. Avakian’s injuries would not support a malpractice claim as it
would be unreasonable and impractical to hold a doctor liable for a procedure that did
not yield a good result when he has exercised the necessary skill).
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have been a proximate cause; however, in that instance, Mrs. Cerny would
have had a separate cause of action for a medical malpractice for an
improperly performed induction. 106 Furthermore, intangible injuries, such
as violating one’s bodily integrity by giving a blood transfusion against
one’s wishes and/or religious beliefs, will not suffice as an injury.107
Thus, even in the remote and unlikely scenario that Ms. Typical were to
die or suffer paralysis as a result of her epidural, so long as the epidural
was properly administered, she would not have an injury under the third
prong of New York’s statute.108 If Ms. Typical receives a negligently
administered epidural that causes her harm, such as an infection, paralysis,
or death, then those injuries would likely satisfy the third prong of the
statute, but she would also have a separate claim for malpractice.109 If Ms.
Typical is offended or distressed because she feels coerced into her choice
like Mrs. DiGeronimo, who suffered emotional distress from having
another person’s blood transfused into her body against her religious
beliefs even though this was not a sufficient injury to sustain a cause of
action, Ms. Typical’s distress will certainly fail to be an injury.110
To sustain a malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, a
plaintiff must meet all three elements of New York’s informed consent
statute.111 Since Ms. Typical is unlikely to meet all three, she cannot
sustain an action based on inadequate informed consent in New York State.
B. In Washington State, Ms. Typical Likely Does Not Have a Cause of
Action Because Failure to Discuss Pain Management Alternatives
Probably Will Not Meet the Necessary Elements of Proof to Establish That
Dr. OB Failed to Secure Informed Consent.
Washington State requires four elements of proof to establish a failure to
secure informed consent: (1) the medical provider did not disclose to the
patient a “material” fact or facts relating to the procedure; (2) the patient
106. See Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that
since the Cesarean section was performed without malpractice, any actual injuries
suffered would not be legally recognized because some injuries will still naturally arise
during properly performed treatment).
107. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that
plaintiff did not receive a legally cognizable injury when she was given a lifesaving
blood transfusion even though she was a devout Jehovah’s Witness).
108. See id. (holding that without a departure from good, acceptable medical care
there can be no legally recognized injury).
109. See id. (determining that a properly performed blood transfusion could not
sustain a malpractice case, but a transfusion that transmitted disease, was the wrong
blood type, or was delayed would result in a valid case).
110. See id. at 908 (defining an injury in a medical malpractice case as causally
related to the breach of care).
111. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a three
prong test based on a reasonably prudent medical practitioner standard).
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consented to the procedure with no or inadequate knowledge of said facts;
(3) a RPP would not have consented had she known the undisclosed
“material facts;” and (4) the procedure proximately caused injury to the
patient.112
1. Ms. Typical May Be Able to Establish the First Two Prongs of the
Informed Consent Statute Because These Prongs Are Generally Undisputed
or Are Questions of Fact for the Jury.
Courts rarely discuss the first two elements of the statute, as they are
factually bound inquiries, and most parties to the litigation will not dispute
treatment information as material facts.113 The parties can, and often do,
stipulate to these elements as in Degel, where the defendant stipulated that
he did not get his patient’s consent before performing the artificial
rupturing of her membranes (AROM).114 When there is dispute over an
element, as occurred in Bundrick, where the parties disagreed as to whether
Mrs. Bundrick consented to the procedure, the evidence is submitted to the
jury.115
In Ms. Typical’s case, because the Washington courts classify most
information that a patient could consider when making a treatment decision
a material fact, it seems likely that the court would find pain management
alternatives to be material facts. 116 The parties will likely either stipulate to
Ms. Typical’s consent, as in Degel, or leave it as a question of fact for the
factfinder, as the court found in Bundrick.117 Dr. OB never discussed any
alternative procedures, and the availability and effectiveness of alternative
pain management techniques would likely have been material facts Ms.
Typical would have at least considered before consenting to the epidural.
Therefore, a Washington court is unlikely to find she was fully informed
under the statute. Nonetheless, Ms. Typical’s signed consent form may
persuade a jury that she consented even if she did not have the information
112. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.70.050 (2011) (stating that a plaintiff must prove
each element of the four-prong test to sustain a claim).
113. See, e.g., Bundrick v. Steward, 114 P.3d 1204, 1208-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding as a matter of law that the surgeon’s identity is a material fact).
114. See Degel v. Buty, 29 P.3d 768, 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (describing the
defendant’s stipulation that he did not discuss the material risks of the AROM with his
patient).
115. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (finding that the jury must determine if the
plaintiff consented by considering evidence of the plaintiff’s oral claims against her
broad written consent).
116. See id. at 1208-10 (noting that the resident’s participation in plaintiff’s surgery
was a material fact); see also Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (considering the risk of cord
prolapse during AROM a material fact).
117. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 770 (allowing parties to stipulate that defendant did not
seek plaintiff’s consent before performing the procedure); Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 120810 (sending the consent question to the jury).
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required to satisfy the statute.118
2. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Establish the Third Prong of the Informed
Consent Statute Because a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Probably
Consent to an Epidural for Pain Management.
Like in New York, Washington courts apply an objective test to
determine whether the physician’s disclosure satisfies informed consent.119
However, unlike New York’s strict balancing of the risks test, which does
not consider remote risks, Washington courts consider the broader
circumstances, including remote risks, when determining if a RPP would
have consented to the epidural.120 In Degel, the jury found for the
defendant, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions and despite conflicting
expert testimony that quantified the risk of cord prolapse, a life threatening
complication for the fetus when a physician performs AROM when the
fetus is high in the pelvis.121 In Bundrick, a jury found the plaintiff’s
signature on a broad standard informed consent form was more dispositive
of the RPP’s consent than the plaintiff’s oral qualifications limiting the
scope of the informed consent form prior to the surgery.122 Because it is
difficult to predict what weight a fact-finder will give different pieces of
evidence, the outcome of any inquiry is not certain.123 Since the majority
of laboring women use epidurals as their primary method of pain relief,
Ms. Typical will face the same hurdles the plaintiff in Degel faced because
Ms. Typical is not likely to overcome the burden of proof necessary to
show that the RPP would not have consented to an epidural.124 Like
Bundrick, Ms. Typical will also have to refute a signed consent form, and it
seems unlikely that Ms. Typical will be able to overcome these factors and

118. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 770 (finding that knowledge is a factual inquiry best
performed by the fact-finder).
119. See id. (explaining that the objective test prevents plaintiffs from stating that
they would not have consented had they known the risks before they manifested).
120. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209-10 (holding that it is the jury who must weigh
the various circumstances to determine whether a RPP would have consented to the
procedure at issue).
121. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (noting that defendant admitted to forgoing patient
consent for AROM because he believed her consent to induction included AROM).
122. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (explaining that the jury found the plaintiff’s
signed, broad consent to “all medical treatment . . . performed . . . by/or at the direction
of the attending physician” was more dispositive of a RPP standard than plaintiff’s oral
rejection of a resident actually operating with her surgeon rather than simply observing
him).
123. See id. (finding that although alternate conclusions may be drawn from the
same evidence, ultimately the jury makes the final determination on matters of fact).
124. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (describing expert testimony that stated the expert
had never had a patient decline an AROM after being informed of the risks and finding
that persuasive as a matter of law).
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prevail on this objective prong.125
3. Unless Ms. Typical Is Injured During the Administration of the Epidural,
She Will Not Have a Cause of Action.
Similar to New York, Washington has classified the lack of informed
consent as a type of medical negligence.126 Washington’s causation
standard is lower than New York’s standard; if an injury occurs that the
physician did not disclose and that would not have occurred if the patient
had chosen an undisclosed alternative, then the injury satisfies the causal
element of the Washington statute.127 Hence, in Bundrick, if the plaintiff
could have passed the objective test for the bowel injury she received
during the surgery and the additional surgery complications that resulted,
without any showing of further negligence beyond the lack of informed
consent, she would have sustained a cause of action.128 Thus, if a properly
administered epidural injured Ms. Typical, she will satisfy this final
element of proof, but without an injury, Ms. Typical will lack a cause of
action.129
Nonetheless, because failing just one element of the negligence standard
makes it impossible to prove failure to secure informed consent, and Ms.
Typical is likely to fail both the objective RPP test and the injury
requirement, she is unlikely to have a cause of action under the Washington
standard.130
C. Under Wisconsin Law, Failure to Discuss Pain Management
Alternatives Likely Violates Dr. OB’s Statutory Obligation to Provide
Information, but Ms. Typical Probably Will Not Have a Cause of Action
Unless She Is Injured by the Administration of the Epidural.
On its face, Wisconsin’s informed consent statute requires the disclosure
of all the risks, benefits, and alternative treatments and specifies a few
125. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (describing the weaknesses of standard consent
forms but upholding the jury’s finding that the signed consent form was dispositive of
consent).
126. See id. at 1207-08 (determining that negligent conduct without proximate
injury does not satisfy a negligence standard).
127. See id. (discussing proximate injury in comparison to battery cause of action
where no injury is required).
128. See id. (stating that injuries which result from medical malpractice have a
separate cause of action, so it would be absurd to require malpractice to meet the injury
prong).
129. See id. (holding that whether the sutures that led to the complications were
improperly done or not was irrelevant to determining injury if the operation itself
lacked consent).
130. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (stating that if the plaintiff fails on
any element, then the claim fails).
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defenses, such as that the “information is beyond what a reasonably wellqualified physician in a similar medical classification would know.”131
Wisconsin courts have created an additional test for informed consent by
consistently holding that the only information required is that which a RPP
would need to make an intelligent treatment decision.132 The failure to
disclose such required information is a negligent act in violation of the
statute; but, to sustain a negligence cause of action for inadequate informed
consent, the plaintiff must have an injury.133
1. Available Pain Management Alternatives Are Likely to Be Alternative
Modes of Treatment That Would Require Disclosure.
All viable medical options that a “reasonably well-qualified physician
would know” must be disclosed to the patient, even if the options are not
considered medically indicated.134 Because the court in Schreiber clearly
articulated that Wisconsin courts find informed consent is a process rather
than a singular event, a court could hold that Ms. Typical’s interactions
with Dr. OB from the prenatal appointments onward were opportunities for
Dr. OB to meet his statutory obligations.135 While comfort measures (such
as point pressure or massage) or water therapy (such as bathtubs or
showers) may not offer the same pain management effectiveness as
epidurals do for the majority of laboring women, some laboring women
have found these pain management techniques effective, and these
techniques are all much less invasive and have none of the serious risks
associated with epidurals.136 Therefore, just as the patient in Brown could
compare a double mastectomy with periodic mammograms or a needle
biopsy even though the procedures had different risks and effectiveness in
identifying or preventing breast cancer, a court is likely to find that Ms.
Typical would want the ability to consider various pain management
alternatives with different risks and degrees of effectiveness in alleviating
131. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating an expansive disclosure
requirement with limited defenses for justifying disclosure failures such as emergency
situations).
132. See Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 366 (Wis. 1999) (determining the
doctor’s duty to provide information from the patient’s need because the purpose of
informed consent is patient autonomy).
133. See id. at 365 (holding that known, possible complications of a properly
executed procedure will suffice as an injury to sustain a negligence cause of action).
134. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (articulating an expansive disclosure requirement).
135. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. 1999)
(holding that while, at some point in most procedures, a patient may no longer be able
to withdraw consent for practical reasons there is no need to arbitrarily create a moment
of informed consent at a particular point in the treatment).
136. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 174-75 (comparing epidural effectiveness and
possible side effects with other pain relief methods to illustrate that epidurals are
excellent tools when necessary but should be applied cautiously).
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her pain before making her decision.137 Furthermore, given that pain
management techniques such as comfort measures, water therapy, doulas,
and encouraging freedom of movement have been sufficiently studied to be
classified as evidence-based alternatives, it is unlikely that a Wisconsin
court would accept Dr. OB’s possible defense that a “reasonably wellqualified” obstetrician would be unfamiliar with these alternatives.138
Whether Dr. OB would find them medically indicated is irrelevant since
the court in Schreiber held that the doctor’s opinion of the treatment option
is immaterial.139 Thus, Ms. Typical would likely be able to establish that
information regarding alternative pain management treatments is the type
of information that Wisconsin’s informed consent statute requires.
2. Even Though a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Likely Consider
Knowledge of Other Pain Management Techniques Required to Make an
Informed Decision, a Reasonably Prudent Patient May Still Choose an
Epidural to Treat Labor Pain.
Unlike the objective standards previously analyzed under the New York
and Washington laws, Wisconsin courts use the RPP standard to first
determine what information must be disclosed, rather than using it solely as
a predictor for what treatment the RPP would choose.140 Another unique
aspect of Wisconsin law is that if a patient unequivocally states her
subjective treatment decision prior to the procedure or injury, then
Wisconsin courts do not consider whether the RPP would have made a
different treatment decision.141 In Brown, the RPP would have required
knowledge of less invasive alternatives and an adequate explanation of the
procedure’s risks before the RPP could make an intelligent decision as to
whether she should undergo a double mastectomy.142 After the Brown
court determined that the RPP would require that information, the jury
137. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 371-73 (weighing the probability of contracting
breast cancer against the effectiveness and risks of various treatment options).
138. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 36-38 (examining common practices in maternity
care and evaluating their effectiveness to find that many routine practices such as
supine pushing are classified as “ineffective or harmful” while many untraditional
methods such as ensuring freedom of movement are “beneficial”).
139. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 30-31 (holding that a patient has the right to
choose any of the medically-viable treatments without being limited by a physician’s
recommendation).
140. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 366 (emphasizing that patient autonomy requires
adequate information).
141. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 34 (explaining that the objective test prevents a
patient’s decisions from being affected by hindsight, but when a patient’s decision is
clearly articulated prior to the procedure, the objective test should not be applied
because it may lead to “absurd results”).
142. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 364 (determining that without adequate information
the choice becomes illusory).
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found that, based on all the statutorily required treatment information of
risks, benefits, and alternatives, a RPP would not have consented to a
double mastectomy.143 In Schreiber, the court held that a RPP would have
wanted to have additional information regarding the risks and benefits of
continuing the Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (VBAC) compared with a
Cesarean section.144 Furthermore, because the patient in Schreiber clearly
articulated that she did not want to proceed with the VBAC and, instead,
wanted her physician to perform the Cesarean section, the court held it was
not necessary to determine whether a RPP would have continued to the
VBAC or opted for a Cesarean section because the patient’s undisputed
wishes refuted any claim of hindsight.145
Here, Ms. Typical should be able to establish that a RPP would need to
know pain management alternatives to make an informed decision
regarding treatment options because, by offering her only one pain
management option, Dr. OB circumscribed Ms. Typical’s decision-making
ability.146 Wisconsin’s clear emphasis on patient autonomy strongly
supports the inference that a RPP requires knowledge regarding treatment
alternatives.147 However, because epidural rates are so high in America,
and the most serious risks⎯paralysis and death⎯are very remote, it may
be difficult to establish that a RPP would not have consented to an
epidural.148 Nonetheless, in light of rising maternal mortality rates, the
United States’ poor maternal health care rating in comparison to other
industrialized nations, and the coercive nature that many argue is rampant
in maternity care, the proposition that the average patient is no longer a
RPP when it comes to maternity care is not an unreasonable one.149
Therefore, it is uncertain whether Ms. Typical can pass the Wisconsin RPP
test.

143. See id. (acknowledging that a double mastectomy is an invasive procedure that
cannot completely eliminate the chance that a woman will develop breast cancer).
144. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 37 (specifying that new conditions require
evolving discussions of informed consent).
145. See id. at 34 (arguing that clearly articulated, subjective intent prior to the
procedures shifts the standard from an objective standard to a subjective standard).
146. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 366 (conveying that requiring that the patient be
provided with a broad range of information during the informed consent process helps
to assure the patient’s autonomy).
147. See id. at 369 (describing the importance of informed consent in protecting
fundamental rights and describing the patient’s dependence on the doctor to provide
information material to the patient’s ability to make an informed decision).
148. See id. at 364 (inferring that a reasonably prudent patient will accept some level
of risk, particularly depending on the benefits of the procedure).
149. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at 1, 3, 79 (reporting that maternity care
failures in America have risen to the point of human rights violations).
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3. Unless Ms. Typical Receives an Injury Caused by the Administration of
the Epidural, She Will Not Have a Cause of Action.
Under Wisconsin state law, failure to obtain informed consent is a type
of medical malpractice, which is a negligence cause of action.150
Therefore, even though a physician would be in breach of his duty to
inform by failing to disclose all of the information required by the statute, a
patient would not have a cause of action unless he or she could show a
proximate injury.151 However, Wisconsin courts consider any injury, even
normal complications that result from the un-consented procedure, to be a
proximate injury.152 Hence, when the plaintiff in Brown suffered
disfigurement and discomfort following her double mastectomy, she
sustained sufficient injuries to succeed in an informed consent cause of
action.153 Injuries that result from a physician’s failure to comply with a
patient’s request can also sustain an action, as in Schreiber, where if the
physician had performed the requested Cesarean section at any point during
the seven and a half hours following the plaintiff’s initial request, the child
would have been born healthy.154
Here, if Ms. Typical and her child experience no injury as a result of the
epidural, she will not have a cause of action.155 Even if Ms. Typical can
unequivocally establish that the statute requires the disclosure of pain
management alternatives, that a RPP would have required information
about these alternatives to make an intelligent decision, and that a RPP
would not have consented to an epidural had she known of the other
alternatives, she cannot sustain a claim without a legally recognized injury
because informed consent is a negligence action.156

150. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 33 (explaining that failing to ensure informed
consent is a negligent act that requires a proximate injury for a cause of action).
151. See id. (holding that if plaintiff’s daughter had been born healthy, then the
plaintiff would not have had a cause of action).
152. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 365 (finding that plaintiff’s disfigurement and pain
following the properly performed surgery constituted an injury).
153. See id. (indicating that although the case had to be remanded for a new trial, on
other grounds, the jury originally awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in damages).
154. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 32-35 (holding that plaintiff’s daughter was born
a spastic quadriplegic because she was not delivered prior to plaintiff’s uterus rupture,
which would not have occurred had the physician ceded to patient’s request).
155. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 174-75 (describing how one percent of women
may experience a severe spinal headache, but only 1 in 100,000 women might
experience severe complications such as death or paralysis).
156. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (describing informed consent as the
codification of a physician’s duty).
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D. Informational Standing Could Provide a Legally Cognizable Injury and
Allow Ms. Typical to Pursue a Cause of Action in Some Jurisdictions.
Informational standing is a possible mechanism to remedying violations
of informed consent that do not result in any injury other than the denial of
information and, consequentially, infringe upon the private right of bodily
integrity.157 In FEC v. Akins, the plaintiffs were denied information to
which they were legally entitled, and the Court speculated that this
information would have aided the citizens in making their choice at the
polling booth.158 The FEC was not prohibiting the plaintiffs from voting,
but by restricting information the FEC infringed on the plaintiffs’
fundamental right enough to constitute an injury-in-fact.159 By analogy,
when a physician does not disclose adequate information for a patient to
provide informed consent, that lack of information could constitute a
sufficient injury to sustain a legal claim, even if the damages may be
nominal, because such a remedy is necessary to protect bodily integrity, a
fundamental right.160 Unlike its common law ancestor medical battery, in
which a mere offensive touching without injury constituted a cause of
action, lawmakers have codified informed consent as a subset of medical
negligence.161 Thus, if there is no injury, there is no remedy, even if the
physician violated the right.162
Nevertheless, recognizing an injury will not sustain a cause of action in
all three jurisdictions. In New York State, the state statute will still prohibit
Ms. Typical from exercising her right of action to recover for lack of
informed consent because Ms. Typical is likely to fail all three elements of
the informed consent statute, even if the last element, proximate injury, is
satisfied.163
In Washington State, if Washington law recognizes
157. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 640 (hypothesizing that FEC v. Akins, 523 U.S.
11 (1998), could be interpreted to allow Congress to give any citizen standing by
creating specific legal interests in the rights any specific legislation intends to protect).
158. See Akins, 523 U.S. at 21 (explaining the importance of the information to
voters, but nonetheless noting it was unnecessary to support the purpose further
because of the clear statutory empowerment of the voters by Congress).
159. See id. at 11, 12 (holding the voters passed the testing requirement without
overturning the FEC regulations).
160. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914)
(holding that the autonomy to determine what happens to one’s own body is a
fundamental right, except in the face of an emergency where informed consent cannot
be obtained because the patient is unconscious).
161. See Shipley, supra note 16 (noting every state has an informed consent statute
and violations of the statute are a type of medical malpractice).
162. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) (explaining that disclosing information or withholding information
regarding the level of risk of a procedure, when obtaining a patient’s informed consent,
requires the physician to exercise professional judgment).
163. See supra Part III.A (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under New York State
law, showing she lacks a cause of action).
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informational standing as an injury, Ms. Typical may be able to prove
failure to secure informed consent, but the key issue will be whether she
can pass Washington’s RPP standard, which cannot be determined
conclusively.164 Finally, under Wisconsin state law, Ms. Typical would
likely have a cause of action under Breach of the Physician’s Duty to
Inform because the only element that she conclusively failed to establish
was proximate injury.165 Informational standing does not unite informed
consent with medical battery, but in some jurisdictions, it could prevent the
courts from barring legal remedies for informed consent violations that
occur without additional injury.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Despite spending more money on maternity care than any country in the
world, America’s maternity care system is ranked almost last among
industrialized nations.166 America is one of only four nations with
increasing maternal mortality, and American women today are twice as
likely to die because of childbirth as their mothers.167 Society has
permitted litigation fears and defensive medicine to coerce women’s
choices in childbirth, and the outcomes for women have not improved.168
On principle, coercion is incompatible with patient autonomy and
American values, but in practice, it drives a maternity care system that is
expensive and poor.169 Choice and consumerism drive improvement in the
marketplace, and healthcare is a market that suffers without choice.170
By analyzing three different standards for determining what constitutes a
violation of a patient’s informed consent rights, clear differences stand out.
In states like New York, patients cannot remedy an informed consent
failure. 171 So long as a physician is not negligent, a patient cannot sustain
164. See supra Part III.B (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under Washington law,
showing she probably lacks a cause of action).
165. See supra Part III.C (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under Wisconsin law,
showing she may have a cause of action).
166. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at xx (noting that although the United
States’ care of severely premature infants is among the best in the world, a woman is
seventy percent more likely to die in childbirth in America than in Europe).
167. See id. at 4 (noting that of the four world nations with increasing maternal
mortality, the United States and Canada stand alone, as Afghanistan has been war torn
for ten years, and Norway had a statistically insignificant increase).
168. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 5-7 (describing how physicians can distort
information to coerce patient choices).
169. See id. (detailing American maternity care costs per capita that are two to three
times as high as those in countries of comparable wealth).
170. See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 34, 267-71 (describing the complex interplay of
rights and economics in the eighty billion dollar a year maternity care industry).
171. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (upholding
the injury requirement even when the medical treatment offends the patient’s religious
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a cause of action even if a physician intentionally withholds important
treatment information; therefore, without an avenue to remedy informed
consent violations, New York patients lack a right to informed consent.172
All states should, instead, follow Washington and Wisconsin in adopting
the reasonably prudent patient standard because, in practice, using the
reasonable medical provider standards cedes almost absolute discretion to
the physician.173 Though the RPP standard serves an important role for
minimizing litigation and allowing hindsight to dictate a patient’s priorities
after the fact, states like Wisconsin are correct to decline to apply this
objective test in the face of clear revocation or clear limitations of consent
prior to the treatment.174
Bodily integrity, like property rights, depends on exclusivity to define
the outer edges of the right.175 Thus, requiring an injury beyond the
invasion of bodily integrity is a troublesome issue that the concept of
informational standing could remedy.176 Just as the Akins court held that
failing to disclose political information circumscribed suffrage rights,
failing to disclose treatment information circumscribes bodily integrity.177
States should recognize informational standing in this context because it
would give plaintiffs the opportunity to sustain a cause of action, which
would allow courts to define and defend the right to informed consent.178
This Comment used maternity care for its informed consent analysis
because maternity care lends itself to comparison and analysis more easily
than other aspects of our health care system, but the vulnerabilities of
patient autonomy exist in all medical fields.

beliefs and finding that the patient’s emotional distress regarding the blood transfusion
did not constitute an injury).
172. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (holding that a
right without a remedy is no right at all).
173. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (holding the physician’s
disclosure decisions can circumscribe patient autonomy).
174. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 34 (Wis. 1999)
(stating that applying an objective test in the face of clear revocation of consent could
lead to “absurd results”).
175. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 279-81 (explaining how redress, even through
notional damages, protects and defines rights).
176. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 523 U.S. 11, 12 (1998) (holding that
Congress may grant standing to citizens to enforce statutory information disclosure
requirements).
177. See id. at 21 (concluding that a voter would consider the information at issue
before casting his vote).
178. See supra Part III.D (explaining that under Wisconsin law, informational
standing would likely allow Ms. Typical to sustain a cause of action).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss1/6

28

Curran: Informed Consent: A Right without a Remedy Examined through the L

2012]

INFORMED CONSENT

161

V. CONCLUSION
Not every important idea or entitlement is a legal right. A legal right
requires a legal mechanism to articulate it and a process to remedy
infringements upon the right.179 Informed consent evolved from the
common law’s recognition that individuals should be the ones that
determine what happens to their body, and seeking medical treatment is not
a waiver of the right to be free from trespass.180 As medicine and the law
became more sophisticated, informed consent changed from battery to a
form of negligence.181
Physicians gained protection through the
development of medical malpractice; by decreasing liability exposure,
medical malpractice empowered doctors to use their judgment, which
likely brought some benefits to their patients.182
However, the classification of informed consent as a type of negligence
weakened the right of bodily integrity by requiring an injury beyond the
violation of the private right.183 States should apply the doctrine of
informational standing to informed consent because the denial of
information circumscribes the right to bodily integrity enough to constitute
an injury.184 In states like New York, informed consent has become an
illusory concept with no remedy.185 Even in patient-centered states like
Washington or Wisconsin, informational standing is necessary to ensure
plaintiffs can sustain a cause of action for informed consent failures.186
Liberty requires vigilance in order to preserve or, in some states, take back
patient autonomy. Courts and legislatures need to examine their informed
consent laws to ensure that individuals have a mechanism to assert their
right to bodily integrity because a right without a remedy is no right at all.

179. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (explaining that a
right without a remedy is just an idea).
180. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914)
(articulating that competent adults have an absolute right to be secure in their person).
181. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) (explaining that the disclosure of treatment information is a sensitive matter
that requires a physician’s discretion).
182. See Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed Choice: Physicians’ Duty to Disclose
Nonreadily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 497-500 (1993)
(discussing the history and therapeutic belief in medicine regarding patient ignorance).
183. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 178-80 (explaining that medical malpractice decreases
physicians’ liability exposure).
184. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (discussing how adequate
disclosure empowers patient autonomy).
185. See supra Part III.A (concluding that there is no stand-alone cause of action for
failure to obtain informed consent under New York law).
186. See supra Part III.D (explaining that informational standing provides a
mechanism for asserting a cause of action because it recognizes the withholding of
information as an injury).
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